# AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22

### PDCP – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### “The” isn’t the whole.

**Random House 6** Unabridged Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)>

(used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article *a* or *an*): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

## Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### NATO-Turkey co-operation is both possible and necessary.

Jeffrey 6/15 (James, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship" June 25, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship)

A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats in Syria and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators reacted vigorously, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be thrown out of NATO.

Shifting attitudes toward Turkey

Such dramatic flips in Turkish policy, gelding any predictable diplomacy, have become a hallmark of both Turkish president Erdogan and the convoluted internal political system with his party, dependent on an extremist nationalist partner. Such flips also make efforts to resolve issues such as those above (let alone the underlying rift between Ankara and NATO allies), a high-risk endeavor which most Western leaders avoid, writing Turkey off as a lost cause. But as Ukraine has demonstrated, Turkey is vital to containing Russia, as it has been to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, missile defense against Iran, operations in the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It is just too big, too important, and at times too problematic to ignore.

While the Ukraine conflict is now generating strife between Turkey and NATO over Scandinavian accession, it also offers a chance to improve relations between them. That conflict resembles nothing seen since the late 1930s and immediate post-war period, with the very survival of the world order at stake. Winning this conflict, by maintaining Ukraine’s survival as an independent state and deterring new Russian aggression, while avoiding escalation into the unknown, is a categorical imperative not experienced since the Cold War. While this is true of the Alliance as a whole, it is especially relevant for Turkey, a front line state with a long history under Russian pressure.

Furthermore, experience shows Turkey can be cooperative. The Bush administration worked well with Turkey on counter-PKK operations, and the Obama administration negotiated a NATO anti- Iranian ballistic missile radar deployment. The 2019 Pence-Erdogan ceasefire in Northeast Syria still holds despite Turkish threats, and the two capitals handled well President Biden’s acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. And, ironically, despite deep geostrategic hostility and recent military clashes, Russia and Turkey maintain productive presidential-level relations, with Putin and especially Erdogan usually following a ‘no-surprises’ principle.

#### Turkey-NATO military partnerships are necessary and successful. Turkey is KEY to NATO military ops.

Çoban and Akar 20 (Samet, Research Fellow @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, Furkan, Research Intern @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, “NATO-Turkey Relations in a Turbulent Environment: The Military Dimension of NATO-Turkey Relations”, NATO-Turkey Relations Policy Brief, Beyond the Horizon ISSG, December 2020, <https://behorizon.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/NATO-Turkey-Relations-Policy-Brief_Beyond-the-Horizon-ISSG.pdf>)

Unlike political turmoil, military relations between Turkey and NATO are on track. What most analysts agree about is that there is no shrinkage of Turkish military contribution to NATO. Turkey (still) provides substantial contributions to the NATO and EU-led operations. As Flanagan and Wilson point out "engagement slowed somewhat in the immediate months after the coup, almost 95 per cent of planned operations and activities with US Army Europe forces resumed the following year. In fact, the TSK [TAF] participated in ten US Army Europe exercises during 2016, which was a significant increase over previous years."

Along with these operations, Turkey contributes to the NATO Response Force (NRF) substantially, e.g. hosting an NRDC Headquarters in Istanbul and providing naval vessels to SNMG-2 and SNMCMG-2 that are maritime components of the NRF.

More importantly, Turkey will resume the command of NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead force of the NRF in 2021 and is expected to assign additional military headquarters regarding NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI).16

The active participation of Turkey is incoherent with harsh rhetoric of both sides. In case, a Turkey, which is pivoting to the East, is expected to diminish its contributions. Why doesn't Turkey decouple from NATO at least to some extent? Conversely, cooperation is still increasing amidst tensions. For example, the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence was accredited by NATO in June 2020. 17

Turkish Armed Forces is amalgamated with NATO. Its broad participation necessitates a deeper integration, i.e. interoperability and capacity to conduct exercises, campaigns together with the other members of the Alliance. Almost all Turkish assets, whether they are made indigenously or exported, are produced according to NATO standards and contain critical components that are imported from Western allies. Moreover, maintenance and operating procedures, spare parts, technical manuals, field manuals, signals, messaging standards are generated and maintained as such, that requires a specific training and foreign language, i.e. English, know-how, all of which takes a long time to acquire.

NATO countries are Turkey's most critical foreign arms suppliers. Turkey imported/ordered all primary weapons from NATO countries between 2016-2019 except for a training aircraft from Pakistan and S-400 system, that is an extraordinary one with a top-down order as Egeli points out.18 For instance, Turkey is the number one customer for the German defence industry, accounting one-third of German arms exports.19

Substantial Turkish commitments to NATO entities as well as the active participation of TAF to the NATO missions and operations contradict with the Turkish government's (domestic) political discourse and hardliners in the Western community. This continuation indicates that traditional tendencies are still in place when it comes to defence and security priorities.

#### The plan’s inclusion solves – integrating Turkey into a unified NATO vision. Exclusion merely maintains squo conflict.

Jeffrey 6/15 (James, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship" June 25, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship)

A new course

The first step out of this dilemma is for all sides to recognize that with Russian aggression, they face a unique international situation that requires subordination of all other priorities to the core objective. That sort of wisdom, familiar to Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman, military planners, and in a perverse way, Putin, has largely faded in the West since 1989, replaced by what has become conventional foreign policy thinking: nothing is critical and innumerable factors compete for consideration, for example moral, ideological, humanitarian, domestic, security, alliance, economic, personal, or usually some triangulation of them.

Both sides must prioritize vigorously containing Russia, seek transactional deals on those issues between them that can be resolved, and ignore the others.

In the impasse between Turkey and NATO, this conventional thinking encourages states, buffeted by various interests and negative voices towards Turkey, to treat it as a second class, suspect member of the alliance, while benefiting from its extraordinary NATO contributions. But conventional thinking also pushes Ankara, with its domestic pressures, to see the Ukrainian crisis as simply another opportunity to extort Europe over Turkey’s second-class status, EU accession, arms sales, and specific issues such as the PKK and the Aegean. Both sides thus must prioritize vigorously containing Russia, seek transactional deals on those issues between them that can be resolved, and ignore the others. In short, accepting partners as they are, not as they should be.

The immediate challenge is NATO accession. Here Turkey has to blink first and recognize that the stakes, not just stopping Russia but preserving its own relations with NATO, require accepting half a loaf (not always an Erdogan government trait). It cannot expect Sweden and Finland to extradite people to a state whose legal system is under continuous international criticism, nor for those countries to silence freedom of expression, even when it is sympathetic to the terrorist PKK cause. It should also be accepted that, while the fight against the PKK is truly important to Turkish security, it is still secondary to Russia advancing on its borders.

In return, Sweden should lift its ban on arms sales to Turkey (and the US Congress the same with its informal ban, now impacting the F-16 sale). Finland and especially Sweden, given their long affinity for “national liberation” movements, should cut official contacts with the PKK and its fronts, recommit to Helsinki Final Act on noninterference in others’ internal affairs and give assurances they would cooperate in NATO on issues important to Turkey.

Turkey’s partners should continue counseling it against a new incursion into northern Syria. But if Turkey compromises by only attacking PKK elements west of the Euphrates, away from US forces and the main anti-ISIS effort, Washington’s objections should be muted. Likewise, partners should urge Turkey to stop overflying Greek territory, but simultaneously speak out on provocative Greek policies.

While these steps can manage the immediate crises Turkey has launched, the longer-term solution, moving to a transactional relationship, needs highest level US leadership. First, such a relationship requires dealing with Erdogan; if Putin can do it with a geostrategic opponent, why cannot American and European leaders with an ally, however difficult, given the stakes. Second, the US needs someone at a very senior level to complement the American ambassador as the administration’s Turkish file lead, not to communicate with the Turks but to corral the undisciplined official and unofficial Washington policy worlds. That world can torpedo any foreign policy effort, but doing so regarding Turkey is child’s play in the absence of presidential engagement and a Washington champion.

#### NATO-Turkey co-op is the only way to deter Russia in the Black Sea and the Middle East.

Ellehuus 19 (Rachel, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with Europe Program @ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving", Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 12, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving>)

The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance.

For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.

A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—and NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns.

### NATO Reunification – L/T – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### The aff’s strategic dialogue solves disputes with Turkey – shared values ensure the alliance will be repaired

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While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, **it has yet to reach** a breaking point or a **point of no return.** Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment **point to** perhaps **better days to come**, given the resilience and endurance of the **ties that bind the two nations together**. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, **both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance**. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, **will work toward increasing harmonization toward the U**nited **S**tates **and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue.** The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, **Turkey is not yet lost**, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic cross- road. The answer lies in the need for the United States to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, their changing nature and character, as well as Tur- key’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and its goal of becoming a great regional power. **Turkey, NATO, and the U**nited **S**tates **share Western values, and** **these values**, although not equal for all partners, **are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied properly** across the board.

#### US-Turkey relations can be repaired through multilateralism – neither want the instability of a hostile relationship

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In the recent decade, the U.S. has pursued a strategy to support armed Kurdish groups to repel radical Islamic terror groups, particularly ISIS. Nevertheless, Turkey has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Kurdish administration and its nationalist ambitions. These concerns are pushing Turkey into the arms of U.S. rivals in the region. Both Iran and Russia are expanding their authority in the region by establishing political and military support for radical regimes such as Assad’s in Syria and political and militant movements like Hezbollah. These strategic policies are increasingly connecting Iran’s and Russia’s allies in an ever-strengthening regional security complex. Given these regional circumstances, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping between these rival regional security complexes. The primary cause for current problems in U.S.-Turkey relations is not simply the recent actions of the two countries. The complex view of the IR system facilitates the understanding that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is shaped by the feedback loops generated under both regional and global circumstances. The complexity of the international system can trigger a dramatically different evolution of relations between U.S. and Turkey as a feedback (reaction) caused by the U.S. For example, the U.S. does not hesitate to use methods like arming the YPG, even if these methods hurt former allies such as Turkey. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations continue to be vulnerable to the U.S. approach toward minority, rebel groups which have problematic bonds with Turkey. The international roles that the U.S. and Turkey pursued for themselves in the post-9/11 era have had consequences for perceptions of historical friendship or hostilities – what the Regional Security Complex Theory ties to cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of states. There were hostility perceptions among Turkish military and Foreign Service chiefs in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. sought to maintain its global supremacy role. Given its resources, the U.S. cannot help but be superior to smaller, poorer states that do not have Washington’s military capacity. The issue is the way in which the U.S. dominates – that is, its treatment of its allies, not considering their strategic security concerns, etc. Turkey was deeply concerned with events in northern Iraq following the 1991 Iraq war. These events amounted to challenge Turkey’s priority of preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The hostility perceptions in Turkey turned to be reciprocal between the U.S. and Turkey thanks to the feedback loops generated by the 9/11 attacks. The unilateral U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks during the Bush administration undermined the U.S.-led liberal international order and played no small role in the inauguration of Trump as a president who questions this order and views local U.S. allies as burdens on the U.S. If we acknowledge that the complexity of the international relations system is at play here, the causal logic of the complexity approach leads us to expect that Turkey’s internal characteristics can pressure systemic transformation – something other than the predictions generated by the regional security complex approach.83 A U.S. that operates with a systemic moral conscience could assist Turkey in managing its affairs. Facing complexity **invokes improving diplomacy and collaboration, adopting multilateral solutions** and soft power **and constructing** some **advanced strategic partnerships**. If the U.S. chooses to nurture its relationships with allies such as Turkey, the erosion of the U.S. position of influence could be mitigated and the U.S. still could be the primary actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. The underlying message of this paper is that **the U.S. and Turkey are rebuilding their alliance due to various factors.** Both **countries could form a revised alliance as an important constituent of the regional peace system.** Neither of them desires the continuation of the Syrian chaotic status-quo and its accompanying insecurity nor do they desire Iran to dominate with a greater role in Syria or in the Middle East. Clearly, the security of the region is in a state of greater flux today than it has been in the past, yet **tackling the present challenges** in the Middle East **depends on the effective involvement of regional U.S. partners.**

### Kickout Bad – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### The West needs Turkey, despite its constraints.

Hess 6/22 (Maximilian, Central Asia fellow @ the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now”, Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/>)

However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February.

At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival.

The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime.

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But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy.

Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations.

Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence.

#### Turkey kickout collapses deterrence – laundry list of wars.

Pry 19 (Peter, Chief of Staff of the Congressional EMP Commission and served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and @ the CIA, "Expelling Turkey from NATO would create a dangerous foe", The Hill, October 23, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466747-expelling-turkey-from-nato-would-create-a-dangerous-foe/)

[President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump/)is right to try to accommodate Turkey’s legitimate security interests on the Syrian border, while protecting the Kurds, in order to keep Turkey in NATO.

After the United States, Turkey has the second-largest standing armed forces in NATO, with more soldiers (639,000 military, paramilitary and civilian personnel), tanks (3,200), armored fighting vehicles (9,500), artillery (2,400) and military aircraft (1,067 fighter jets, attack helicopters and transports) than Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Turkey’s navy comprises 194 ships, mostly frigates, corvettes and coastal gunships but including 12 submarines.

Some analysts evaluate Turkey as among the most militarily powerful nations, ranking ninth among 137 military powers worldwide.

Do we really want to kick Turkey out of NATO and have its military power and strategic geography aligned with Russia?

Geographically, Turkey occupies some of the most [strategically](https://www.bartleby.com/essay/Turkeys-Strategic-Geographical-Location-In-The-World-FK49ZEYTJ) important territory in the world. It is the only NATO member state in the Middle East, bordering Syria and Iraq, near Lebanon and Israel, a region that has been — and continues to be — the crucial crossroads of empire and history since biblical times. Turkey controls the Bosporus Straits, Marmara Sea and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, giving it the capability to contain Russia’s powerful [Black Sea Fleet](https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a-new-russian-black-sea-fleet-coming-or-is-it-here/). Turkey’s geographic location and strong military makes it the anchor of NATO’s southern flank against Russian aggression.

Turkey also is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, with 98 airports capable of supporting NATO air operations over the Middle East, Black Sea and the Balkans.

It is one of only five NATO states (the others being Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands) storing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Some 50 B-61 nuclear bombs are bunkered at Incirlik Air Force Base, controlled by U.S. personnel stationed there.

Washington’s foreign policy elites are so fixated on recent Kurdish [contributions](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/flashback-how-us-backed-kurds-defeated-isis-in-kobani-syria/) to defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) that they seem to have forgotten Turkey’s much longer record as an ally of the U.S. and NATO:

* Turkey fought alongside the U.S. during the Korean War (1950-1953).
* During the early Cold War, Turkey agreed to basing U.S. nuclear bombers and IRBMs on its territory, making Turkey a nuclear target for the USSR. (President Kennedy was able to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union and resolve the October 1962 [Cuban missile crisis](https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis) by secretly promising Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to remove the U.S. IRBMs.)
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Bosnia during [Operation Deliberate Force](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/history.html) (1995).
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Serbia during [Operation Allied Force](https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/allied-force.html) (1999).
* Turkey participated in Baltic Sea air patrols demonstrating support for the NATO Baltic states (2006).
* For years and continuing today, Turkish forces have participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo.
* Turkey provided military and intelligence support to U.S. operations that destroyed the ISIS terrorist “caliphate.”

Turkey’s membership in NATO quelled the long cycle of conflicts and wars with Greece, also a NATO member. Significantly, even Turkey’s controversial [invasion of Cyprus in 1974](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866000/3866521.stm) did not trigger a war with Greece, in no small part because both are NATO members.

Unfortunately, Turkey under President Erdogan is abandoning secularism and democratic norms, becoming an Islamist authoritarian state, and pulling away from the U.S. and NATO. Indeed, Erdogan is beginning to align Turkey with Russia, buying Russian military equipment over U.S. objections.

Erdogan even has threatened to develop nuclear weapons, which justifies withdrawing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. Yet Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Middle East allies all have legitimate fear of Iran developing nuclear missiles, so threatened nuclear proliferation by Turkey and others may be a sign of U.S. failure to uphold its alliance obligations through credible extended nuclear deterrence and other means.

Turkey controls the flow of Middle Eastern refugees into European NATO, a crucial role whereby a friendly Turkey can help stabilize its neighbors — or an unfriendly Turkey could unleash a human flood into Europe.

Israel, too, will be better served if Turkey remains in NATO and, thus, a moderating influence on Islamist Erdogan, who eventually may be replaced by a secular leader. Imagine the threat to U.S. and Israeli interests if Turkey leaves NATO and becomes another Islamist rogue state like Iran.

Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO may, or may not, be historically inevitable. But the United States should do everything possible to keep such a valuable ally in NATO and prevent Turkey from becoming a dangerous foe.

## Defense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC

### No Kickout – Link D – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### Turkey won’t leave NATO, despite animosity.

Rubin 5/26 (Michael, Senior Fellow @ American Enterprise Institute, Specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East, "The Real Reason Turkey Will Never Voluntarily Leave NATO", American Enterprise Institute - AEI, May 26, 2022, <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-real-reason-turkey-will-never-voluntarily-leave-nato/>)

Turkey does not belong in NATO, but there is no formal mechanism to expel wayward members. At a minimum, Erdogan gets power by forcing the United States and other NATO members on one hand, and Russia on the other to bid for its support. Erdogan’s animosity toward the United States is famous, however. If ideology rather than material gain motivates him, however, he gains more from being a Trojan horse in the consensus-governed alliance than from voluntarily exiting it.

Back to Mitsotakis: the power of the maps he provided in his meetings cannot be overstated. There have been hundreds of Turkish violations of Greek airspace. Such violations are not neutral: Turkey cannot provide any instance of Greek violations of its airspace or unsanctioned overflights of its territories. After the United States began utilizing the port of Alexandroupolis, Turkey began violating airspace over that location as well. Turkey has also threatened military force against the Greek island of Kastellorizo.

This brings up a tricky problem. Whenever Turkey ratchets up tensions with Greece, diplomats seek to defuse tension, and analysts and journalists talk about the possibility of war between two NATO members. The dynamics, however, change considerably when Turkey leaves NATO. Any attack on Kastellorizo, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, Ikaria, or any other Greek territory would trigger NATO Article 5 which stated that if any NATO ally is a victim of an armed attack, it is akin to an attack on every member of the alliance and all members will respond accordingly. Simply put, inside NATO, Turkey can be a bully and get away with its behavior. Outside NATO, however, Erdoǧan would face real consequences for his actions.

Erdogan likes to project an image of power but as even the Turkish people have come to realize, he is in reality a thin-skinned coward. After multiple purges, the Turkish army is today like Russia’s a shell of its former self. Erdogan will remain in NATO against all pressure otherwise because to agree to go his own way would be to expose Turkey for its true weakness.\

#### Turkish economic interests force them to stay in NATO.

Cagaptay and Hills 21 (Soner, a Senior Fellow with Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Carol, Senior Producer and Host for The World, "Turkey's Erdoğan strategically backtracks threat to expel Western diplomats, political analyst explains," World from PRX, October 25, https://theworld.org/stories/2021-10-25/turkeys-erdo-strategically-backtracks-threat-expel-western-diplomats-political)

Now, it's interesting since these embassies put out statements saying they won't be interfering in Turkey's internal affairs. Does it appear that they were pressured into backing down over this case?

No, I would actually say the opposite. I think this is a step back for President Erdoğan. It's the first time he's stepping down away from confrontation because he actually threatened to expel these ambassadors. He said it was a done deal over the weekend. And of course, now I think that his administration has walked back the stated policy. These ambassadors look like they won't be expelled. So, this is one of the first instances we see Erdoğan is stepping down in the face of a united front of Western countries — US and European countries acting together. It's quite significant. Erdoğan, I think in recent years, has benefited from a strongman image domestically, and a step back, of course, would be a big dent in his strongman image.

Turkey's relationship with the US and other Western nations has been strained for some time over a variety of issues. Is this kind of back-and-forth the new normal between Turkey and the West?

Yes and no. So, the assumption was that in recent months, Erdoğan had launched the charm offensive and as a resource-poor country, Turkey needs international investment to return growth. So, Erdoğan has been, for about a year now, on his best behavior toward Europe because of deep economic ties with it and also toward the United States, toward President Biden. He wants to create a narrative of good ties with Biden in order for markets to have confidence to invest in Turkey again.

Turkey's currency is also weathering a crisis as it continues to depreciate. What's behind the falling Turkish lira and what's the government's role in this?

... largely economic mismanagement, erratic policies that Erdoğan detests interest rates or high interest rates, and Turkey has quite high inflation, so that has to be matched with high interest rates, but obviously, he's voting against those policies, and there has been a lot of change at the helm of economic policies.

Is the depreciating Turkish lira going to affect Erdoğan's position at home?

Big time. Big time. And I think the reason why Erdoğan did not follow up with his threat to expel 10 Western ambassadors is because he was told by his advisers that if Turkey had a rupture in its ties with its most important economic partners — European countries — it would not only destroy the country's economy, but it would destroy what remains of Erdoğan's base.

### AT: NATO Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### NATO fails—free riding

NYT 11 “Talking Truth to NATO”¶ Published: June 10, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/opinion/11sat1.html?\_r=0

America’s key strategic alliance throughout the cold war is in far deeper trouble than most members admit. The Atlantic allies face a host of new and old dangers. Without more and wiser European military spending — on equipment, training, surveillance and reconnaissance — NATO faces, as Mr. Gates rightly warned, “a dim if not dismal future” and even “irrelevance.”¶ The secretary is retiring at the end of this month, which is likely one of the reasons he jettisoned the diplomatic niceties. But not the only one. As he made clear, this country can no longer afford to do a disproportionate share of NATO’s fighting and pay a disproportionate share of its bills while Europe slashes its defense budgets and free-rides on the collective security benefits.¶ NATO’s shockingly wobbly performance over Libya, after the Pentagon handed off leadership, should leave no doubt about the Europeans’ weaknesses. And while America’s NATO partners now have 40,000 troops in Afghanistan (compared with about 99,000 from the United States), many have been hemmed in by restrictive rules of engagement and shortages of critical equipment. Too many are scheduled for imminent departure.¶ The free-rider problem is an old one but has gotten even worse over the last two decades. During most of the cold war, the United States accounted for 50 percent of total NATO military spending; today it accounts for 75 percent. Mr. Gates was right when he warned of America’s dwindling patience with allies “unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”¶ Decades of underinvestment, poor spending choices and complacent denial about new challenges have created what Mr. Gates called a “two-tiered alliance.” He is right that too many of its members limit themselves to “humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and talking tasks,” and too few are available for the combat missions the alliance as a whole has agreed to assume.¶ Libya, a mission much more directly linked to the security of Europe than of the United States, strikingly illustrates the consequences.¶ Fewer than half of NATO’s 28 members are taking part in the military mission. Fewer than a third are participating in the all-important airstrikes. British and French aircraft carry the main burden. Canada, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, despite limited resources, have made outsized contributions. Turkey, with the alliance’s second-largest military, has remained largely on the sidelines. Germany, NATO’s biggest historic beneficiary, has done nothing at all.¶ Even fully participating members have failed to train enough targeting specialists to keep all of their planes flying sorties or to buy enough munitions to sustain a bombing campaign much beyond the present 11 weeks.¶ That should frighten every defense ministry in Europe. What if they had to fight a more formidable enemy than Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s fractured dictatorship?¶ Combat is not always the best or only solution. NATO needs those European development and peacekeeping capabilities. All alliance members must also have at least the basic military capacities to meet common threats. Without that, the alliance will grow increasingly hollow — a fact that enemies will not miss.¶ Mr. Gates was right to speak out. We hope his likely successor, Leon Panetta, will keep pushing hard. A two-tiered military alliance is really no alliance at all.

#### Collapse spurs EU shift – solves, avoids defence cuts which thump NATO

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute , 4/22/13 “NATOs Lack of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/natos-lack-any-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire>

The most plausible continuing NATO role is to train the militaries of friendly nations to empower them to handle military contingencies in their own neighborhoods. But that doesn’t require a formal military alliance constantly looking for new wars to fight. The biggest challenge facing the alliance is shrinking national force structures. The NATO visitor acknowledged that “all Europeans are cutting their militaries, including the big spenders.” Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both lamented Europe’s waning efforts. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently admitted: “if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe’s ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear.” There’s no reason to believe the reductions won’t continue. Last year the Brookings Institution published a report reviewing widespread cutbacks across the continent. Explained Clara Marina O’Donnell: “current military spending trends are reducing the ability of most NATO allies to contribute to international security.” Troop numbers are coming down sharply. Moreover, recently reported Stars and Stripes, “Cuts by countries as large as Germany and as small as Latvia have resulted in program cancellations, changed equipment orders and, in the case of Britain, a plan to mothball a new aircraft carrier.” Earlier this year Rasmussen declared that “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense.” Where is it? In 2006 the NATO members promised to spend two percent of GDP on the military. Today the Europeans collectively spend 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, compared to America’s five percent. Americans spend $2333 per person on the military, compared to just $503 by Europeans. Despite the much-maligned budget sequester, Washington continues to account for roughly 40 percent of the entire globe’s military outlays. The visiting official recognized the problem. If we take Secretary Gates’ formulation “that NATO is dead if members don’t spend two percent of GDP, then NATO is dead as they will not spend two percent of GDP.” Thus, he complained that “focusing burden-sharing on finances doesn’t get us anywhere.” Instead, he suggested giving “burden-sharing a different spin.” He argued that despite Europe’s diminishing commitment to the alliance, America still benefited. “The European allies may be useless for many things, but they still provide legitimacy and the continent acts as a worldwide operational hub.” However, that legitimacy is of little account if Washington believes a vital issue to be at stake. The American people don’t care; they will support their government even in the face of widespread international opposition, evident in Vietnam and Iraq, for instance. What turned the U.S. public against these wars were the reality of casualties and the perception of failure. Where legitimacy seems to be important, either the United Nations or a coalition of the willing would prove sufficient. Nor is a formal alliance necessary for base access and logistical backing. Washington could forge replacement arrangements with individual European states as well as any continental European military alliance. Given the deep differences of opinion which emerged over such issues as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, less formal cooperative mechanisms would reduce political tensions. A country could offer operational support without providing combat units or even endorsing a particular conflict. Funding for a nation’s military would not be undercut by participation in an unpopular international conflict.¶ Despite its problems at home, NATO bizarrely is seeking to expand abroad. Rasmussen recently traveled to Japan and South Korea to promote NATO cooperation in Asia. How can a European alliance increasingly incapable of defending Europe play a role in Asia? There are opportunities for non-military cooperation: sharing expertise on civil emergencies, advancing cyber-security, and promoting non-proliferation. However, these relationships could as easily involve the European Union as NATO. Noted Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute, “while NATO has adopted a global perspective, its main activities beyond Europe and Afghanistan thus far have consisted primarily of dialogue.”¶ Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that “The need for a strong military alliance between Europe and North America has never been stronger.” That is nonsense. Neither continent faces an existential military threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor. Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is much about which the U.S. and Europe should cooperate, there is no need for an American-dominated transatlantic military alliance. Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied burden-sharing. Europeans could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves, patrol the Mediterranean, aid the Central Asia states, and protect their interests in North Africa and the Middle East. If they chose not to do so, no worries for America. But they shouldn’t expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive whining about Europe’s defense choices. America’s Cold War security policy shielded war-torn allies until they could recover and gain the economic means and political stability to defend themselves. That policy was a great success. Now Washington should celebrate by turning NATO over the Europeans.

### AT: EU Cred – ! D – Turkey PIC – 2AC

#### EU soft power fails

Dempsey, 11

Judy Dempsey, Int'l Herald Tribune Europe Senior Correspondent, 9/28/11, The Failure of Soft Power, carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45617

Europeans have long believed soft power to be the best instrument to promote their values and their security. They have a strong sense of moral superiority about it, particularly when looking at hard, or military, power. Military action is something that the Europeans leave to the United States, Britain, and France. Even if it wanted to, the European Union cannot do it. It lacks the basic capabilities, such as heavy airlift and logistics. It lacks an integrated defense policy for armament procurement. It also lacks a security strategy that includes the use of hard power as an option. The soft power instruments Europeans have used over the years consist of development aid and civilian assistance, such as training the police and judiciary in some countries. The Europeans also sometimes couple soft power with trade incentives or with sanctions. Above all, they pride themselves on basing their actions on the defense of human rights which are, at least officially, at the core of Europe’s value system. But Europe’s record in making soft power the cornerstone of its security strategy has been patchy. It has been worked incredibly well in Eastern Europe. Enlargement with its plethora of promises and incentives is soft power at its most powerful. But Europe cannot enlarge to the rest of the world. That is where Europe’s soft power policies have had so little, if any success. Take Iran. Years of negotiations with Iran to get it to abandon its nuclear ambitions have gotten the Europeans nowhere. Promises of technical assistance and closer economic cooperation have had no impact on the regime in Teheran, even though some of the sanctions are biting. The reason why the Europeans have failed is because Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is just too stubborn. He seems determined to develop a nuclear military capability for Iran’s own geo-strategic interests no matter what the cost to his people. Soft power can find no grip there. Bosnia-Herzegovina is another case where the instrument has failed. Fifteen years after the Dayton accords that ended the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia is mired in corruption and misrule. This is despite the presence of a large EU police force, not to mention the billions of euros the European taxpayer has poured into this tiny country. The state that the EU is trying to build has never really been accepted by the ethnic communities living there. And the EU is not prepared to stop the bullying and separatist tactics of the Bosnian Serbs in particular. Afghanistan is another stain on the EU’s soft power record. There, the Europeans have done too little and too late, wasting the initial good will of the Afghan people after the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. While the U.S. and its coalition forces were distracted by the war in Iraq, the Europeans did little to fill the gap left in Afghanistan. Europe’s most abject failure is its police-train ing mission there. It is still under-financed and under-staffed. What a shame for what should have been a stellar example of the EU’s use of soft power.

#### EU soft power fails—4 reasons

Dirk Messner 07 [“EU as Protagonist of Multilateralism,” March, www.fes.de/ipg/arc\_07\_d/01\_07\_d/pdf/03\_A\_Messner\_GB.pdf]

Four Weaknesses on the Way to Becoming a Cooperative World Power However, a number of weak points must be set against these assets in terms of the eu setting itself up as a cooperative world power. First, Europe’s only limited economic, technological, and scientific attractive- ness in comparison with the usa (and in future possibly also China and India) implies a loss of »soft power«which should not be underestimated. The capacity to act globally is based not only, perhaps not even principally, on military power, but on top of that on political, economic, and cultural attractiveness. Europe can therefore in future only become a relevant »co- operative world power« if it at the same time overcomes its economic weaknesses and becomes a motor of innovation in the world economy. Secondly, despite the »European Security Strategy« of 2003 the eu has still not managed to develop pan-European interests – which can even be opposed to individual national interests – and, on that basis, common strategies for helping to shape the international system, which can also withstand »heavy storms and a bumpy journey.« The crisis of the eu in the run-up to the Iraq war showed that in difficult international crises it is still the nation states and their capital cities, not the eu, Brussels, or the European Council of Foreign Ministers which ultimately are the relevant actors. The dispute between some European member states con-cerning the reform of the Security Council last year only strengthened this impression. The eu is the most developed regional cooperation project in the world, but still »work in progress«: no longer merely the sum of nation states, more than an association of states, but still clearly not a federal state of Europe. Moreover with the crisis of the European constitution the project of a more effective common eu foreign policy remains blocked for the time being. If this blockade and the loose co- operation between the foreign policies of the member states, as well as of the Commission, remains in place the eu’s global influence will ulti- mately remain very limited. Only a common European foreign policy would provide the opportunity to play a major role in global politics. Thirdly, although the eu is regarded worldwide as a »benevolent player« on the international stage, at the same time it is considered a po- litical actor which, in the context of the troubled further development of the European cooperation and integration project, is preoccupied above all with itself, its complicated decision-making processes and its confused institutional structures. The breath-taking political and economic dy- namics in parts of Asia contrast with the often finickyand stolid machinery of the European Union. And while the usa is reproached with exhibiting the hubris of power the eu must often give the appearance of being in- volved internationally »with the handbrake on.« Over against Europe’s good international reputation overall must be set the not unjustified observation that the eu is still not a truly globally thinking and capable »cooperative world power.« Fourthly, the eu’s efforts to develop its global capacity to act continue to be undermined by the internationally widespread image of »Fortress Europe«. Two things in particular which contribute to this image of the walled-in fortress are, on the one hand, the disputed immigration and migration policy of the Union which in the context of rising refugee move- ments from Africa have gained in importance in recent months; and, on the other hand, above all European agricultural policy is a symbol of the protectionism which inflicts great damage on the image of a cosmopolitan actor with a far-sighted interest in global issues. For example, Europe’s intransigence on agricultural questions in the negotiations with Mercosur on a free trade zone have harmed Europe’s standing in South America. This sketch of the eu’s strengths and weaknesses shows that it has a good starting position from which to gain significance as a global power without giving rise to international worries about an aggressive Europe, or one solely orientated towards its own, narrow interests. On the other hand, the economic, political and institutional construction work is vis- ible on which the eu must build in order to translate its global-gover-nance potential into an effective capacity to act.

#### No European war

Kay 12(Sean Kay, professor of international relations at Ohio Wesleyan University he is Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University, “A new kind of NATO” 1/11/12) http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/11/a\_new\_kind\_of\_nato

First, declare victory! Europe is experiencing unprecedented sustained peace. If there ever was a moment to take advantage of that climate, it is now. The risks of defense re-nationalization are next to zero and potential conventional threats far over the horizon. Meanwhile, austerity programs are incentivizing Europe to economize military spending via deeper integration -- as Britain and France commenced in 2010. The European security dilemmas that required a heavy American military presence have long been resolved. As but just one recent example, late in 2011, Polish Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski stated that: "I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity."